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I. INTRODUCTION 
In an effort to encourage voting in the 2020 election, congresswoman 
Alexandria Ocasio Cortez took to Twitch and broadcast herself playing Among 
Us,1 a mafia-esque game, to almost 440,000 viewers.2  The congresswoman was 
far from the first well-known person to broadcast, or stream, on the site however.  
Drake has made appearances on stream;3 rapper T-Pain regularly broadcasts 
himself playing video games and freestyling;4 and famous soccer player, Neymar, 
recently began streaming on Twitch.5  Twitch has created celebrities, such as 
Ninja and Shroud, who have inked exclusive streaming deals worth millions of 
dollars in the past.6  
Twitch, an Amazon subsidiary,7 has grown steadily since it began in 2011 and 
is today a major player in the online-content marketplace.8  During the second 
quarter of 2020, at the height of the coronavirus lockdown, Twitch had over 5 
billion hours watched and averaged 2.4 million concurrent viewers.9  Even in 
2014, Twitch represented almost 2% of all of the internet traffic in the United 
 
1 Among Us is a video game played by six or more people.  A majority of the players are 
“crew members” who have to fix a spaceship before the “impostor(s),” kill all the crew 
members.  If one of the crew members is killed, the group will meet and try to identify who 
the impostor is.  The group will usually select one person and eject them from the spaceship. 
The game continues until either the crew members correctly eject the impostor(s); fix the 
spaceship; or the impostor(s) kill all of the crew members.  Among Us, INNERSLOTH, 
https://innersloth.com/gameAmongUs.php (last accessed Apr. 30, 2021). 
2 Cecilia D’Anastasio, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez Storms Twitch, WIRED (Oct. 20, 2020), 
https://www.wired.com/story/aoc-among-us-twitch-stream/. 
3 Cady Lang, Leave It to Drake to Break the Internet by Playing a Video Game with a Star-Studded 
Squad, TIME (Mar. 1, 2018), https://time.com/5201151/drake-fortnite-livestream/. 
4 Steven Asarch, T-Pain Encourages Twitch Streamers to Use His New Beats with His ‘Blessing’, 
NEWSWEEK (June 16, 2020), https://www.newsweek.com/t-pain-encourages-twitch-
streamers-use-his-new-beats-his-blessing-1511219. 
5 Neymar da Silva Santos Júnior (@neymarjr), TWITCH, https://www.twitch.tv/neymarjr/ 
(last visited Mar. 27, 2021). 
6 Ninja and Shroud were initially paid to move to Microsoft’s streaming platform, Mixer, 
and subsequently bought out of their contracts for a combined $40 million, $30 million and 
10 million, respectively. Zak Wojnar, Ninja & Shroud Make $40 Million Combined from Mixer 
Buyout in Just Months, SCREENRANT (June 22, 2020), https://screenrant.com/ninja-mixer-
shroud-contract-40-million-shut-down/.  
7 Eugene Kim, Amazon Buys Twitch for $970 Million in Cash, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 25, 2014), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-buys-twitch-2014-8. 
8 Darren Geeter, Twitch Created a Business Around Watching Video Games – Here’s How Amazon 
has Changed the Service Since Buying It in 2014, CNBC (Feb. 26, 2019), https:// 
www.cnbc.com/2019/02/26/history-of-twitch-gaming-livestreaming-and-youtube.html.  
9 Sarah Perez, Twitch Breaks Records Again in Q2, Topping 5B Total Hours Watched, 
TECHCRUNCH (July 1, 2020), https://techcrunch.com/2020/07/01/twitch-breaks-records-
again-in-q2-topping-5b-total-hours-watched/. 
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States and rivaled the primetime viewership of cable networks such as MTV, 
Comedy Central, and CNN.10  
Twitch, like other tech giants such as YouTube and Facebook, relies on user-
generated content to draw viewers to the site.11  Twitch provides a platform for 
people to broadcast live any type of content they wish.12  From video game 
playthroughs and live concerts to political commentary, Twitch has something 
for everyone.13  Unfortunately, Twitch’s platform can be abused by copyright 
infringers and used to distribute infringing material to the masses, exposing 
Twitch to extensive liability as a secondary infringer.  Moreover, because Twitch 
primarily focuses on video game streaming, streams inherently involve works 
that are copyrighted by someone other than the streamer.14 
Luckily for Twitch and other media-based websites, they can qualify for 
statutory safe harbor under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) and 
avoid liability by cooperating with rightsholders to identify and remove infringing 
content.15  For more than twenty years, the DMCA has protected the 
rightsholders’ interests and allowed online service providers (OSPs)16 to grow 
into the massive companies that we know today.17   
The DMCA has experienced some growing pains, however, as the OSPs have 
grown in scale and scope.18  When the DMCA was passed, there was less content 
to sift through, but today the proverbial haystack has grown exorbitantly, making 
it much more onerous to identify and remove infringing content.19  
Rightsholders and OSPs alike are concerned with how the burden should be 
 
10 Kim, supra note 7. 
11 Id. (discussing how users stream unique content to viewers on Twitch similar to how 
users upload content to YouTube or Facebook). 
12 Tiffany Hsu, They Watched the Debate … on Twitch, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2020) (discussing 
the different types of content available on Twitch), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/ 
30/business/media/twitch-trump-biden-debate.html. 
13 Id. (discussing how 125,000 users tuned into one livestream to watch the first 2020 
presidential debate).  
14 See discussion infra Section II.a.1.  
15 See discussion infra Section II.a. 
16 See infra note 44. 
17 See Annemarie Bridy, Is Online Copyright Enforcement Scalable?, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. 
L. 695, 712 (2011) (discussing how implementation of the DMCA facilitated the growth of 
OSPs “who would not expand” without its protections) (citing S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8 
(1998)).  
18  U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., SECTION 512 OF TITLE 17: A REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF 
COPYRIGHTS 9 (2020), https://www.copyright.gov/policy/section512/section-512-full-
report.pdf (“[T]here are substantial questions over whether the current statutory framework is 
adequate to address the sheer volume of copyrighted material online, some of it 
unauthorized.”). 
19 See id. at 9-11 (discussing how the increased scale of the internet has put pressure on 
both rightsholders and OSPs under the DMCA’s notice-and-takedown system). 
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distributed and advocate for the DMCA to be amended to adapt to today’s 
internet.20 
In response, the Copyright Office undertook a study beginning in 2015 into 
the DMCA’s alleged shortcomings and published its report along with suggested 
amendments to the DMCA.21  Of particular concern to Twitch were the 
proposed changes to the knowledge standard,22 which requires OSPs to act on 
infringing content.23  The knowledge standard is an exception to the statutory 
safe harbor of the DMCA that holds an OSP liable if it has actual knowledge or 
“red flag” knowledge of infringing content.24  In its report, the Copyright office 
suggests less stringent knowledge standards that would disrupt the balance 
originally struck by the DMCA and potentially bring ruin on up-and-coming 
websites like Twitch.25   
In this Note, I will argue that Congress should avoid altering the knowledge 
standard by demonstrating the inequitable effects such amendments would have 
on OSPs like Twitch.  Instead, Congress should focus on amendments that 
address the DMCA’s growing pains more directly, particularly by providing 
rightsholders the means to license the OSPs copyright detection technology. 
I will begin by exploring the origins of the DMCA, the history of the common 
law theories of secondary liability, and the Copyright Office’s proposed 
amendments to the knowledge standard.  Next, I will discuss how the proposed 
changes to the knowledge standard would fundamentally change how Twitch 
operates and devastate Twitch and other OSPs like it.  Lastly, I will argue that 
Congress should seek to amend the DMCA to allow for licensing of detection 
technologies or provide rightsholders meaningful input into their development. 
II. BACKGROUND 
In hindsight, it seems painstakingly obvious to say that the internet has 
exploded and evolved in unexpected ways.  In the 1990s, however, Congress was 
just beginning to grapple with the internet’s potential and the existential threat it 
 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 1. 
22 See discussion infra Section II.a. 
23 Twitch employees frequently watch streams and are recognizable within a list of viewers 
as employees. Twitch Badges Guide, TWITCH, https://help.twitch.tv/s/article/twitch-chat-bad 
ges-guide?language=en_US (last visited Apr. 12, 2021).  Presumably it would be easier for a 
Plaintiff in a copyright infringement action to argue that Twitch had knowledge of the 
infringing content if one of Twitch’s employees was watching the stream at the time, 
particularly if the knowledge standard is lowered as proposed. 
24 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A). See discussion infra Section II.a. 
25 See discussion infra Section II.c. 
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posed to copyrights.26  Before the internet, it was difficult for infringers to 
reproduce works on a commercially-viable scale without exposing themselves to 
criminal liability.27  The internet effectively destroyed these limitations and 
created new infringement opportunities that were previously inconceivable.28  
The heightened potential for infringement was facilitated by OSPs whose 
consumers used the OSPs’ websites or services to illegally reproduce and 
distribute copyrighted material.29  While the OSPs themselves were not involved 
in the reproduction or distribution of the works, courts in the early-to-mid 1990s 
often held OSPs liable for the infringing activity of their users under two theories 
of indirect liability.30  Courts extended contributory infringement and vicarious 
liability from the physical space31 into the digital world32 and created a massive 
amount of uncertainty for OSPs in the process.33  
Both Congress and President Clinton recognized the need to adapt copyright 
law to the digital age and address growing concerns about OSP liability, 
culminating with the passing of the DMCA in 1998.34  Among the DMCA’s 
 
26 See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8 (1998) (recognizing that the internet makes copying and 
distributing works easier). 
27 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., supra note 18, at 14 (2020) (discussing how technological limits 
“restricted the scale and quality of both reproduction and distribution”). 
28 Id. 
29  See id. (discussing how the internet facilitated copying and distribution of copyrighted 
works). See also infra note 45 (defining “online service provider” more broadly than a website). 
30 “OSPs were particularly concerned that they could be subject to direct, in addition to 
indirect . . . forms of copyright infringement liability. Secondary liability doctrines enable 
copyright owners to bring claims against third parties that have some relationship to persons 
who themselves commit acts of infringement.”  U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., supra note 18, at 15 
n.49. See, e.g., Playboy Enters. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1559 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (holding the 
Defendant directly liable even though he promptly removed the infringing content as soon as 
he became aware and monitored the site to prevent future infringement); Religious Tech. Ctr. 
v. Netcom Online Comm. Serv., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1374 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (allowing 
contributory infringement claims against Netcom to proceed because there was a question of 
material fact as to whether Netcom knew or should have known about the infringing activity); 
and Sega Enters., Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923, 933 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (holding the 
operator of a bulletin board liable for contributory infringement where he actively solicited 
users to upload unauthorized games).    
31 Shapiro v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963). 
32 Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Comm’n Servs., Inc., 907 F.Supp 1361 (N.D. 
Ca. 1995). 
33 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8 (1998) (“At the same time, without clarification of their 
liability, service providers may hesitate to make the necessary investment in the expansion of 
the speed and capacity of the Internet.”). 
34 Compare id. at 8-9 (suggesting liability for OSPs should be limited to encourage 
investment and stability) with BRUCE A. LEHMAN, INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT 
OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 123-24 (1995) (favoring OSP 
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provisions, Title II specifically addressed the uncertainty surrounding the 
copyright infringement liability of OSPs.35  Instead of clarifying the doctrines of 
contributory infringement and vicarious liability, Congress left the law in its 
“evolving state” and sought to limit OSP liability by creating a series of “safe 
harbors” for OSPs who meet certain statutory criteria.36  Congress felt it had 
“appropriately balanced” the interests of OSPs, rightsholders, and internet 
users.37  The DMCA maintained strong incentives for OSPs and rightsholders to 
cooperate to detect infringing activity and provided more certainty to OSPs 
about their potential copyright infringement liability.38  While Congress intended 
for contributory infringement and vicarious infringement to complement the 
safe harbors of 17 U.S.C. § 512, these doctrines heavily influenced the language 
of the statute, particularly the language of § 512(c), and continue to have serious 
interplay with the statute’s application.39   
First, I will describe the four different safe harbors provided by Section 512 
and discuss how Twitch fits into the statutory regime and maintains its safe 
harbor status.  Second, I will briefly discuss the history of the contributory 
infringement and vicarious liability doctrines and how courts initially adapted the 
doctrines to the digital age. 
A. DMCA SAFE HARBORS AND TWITCH 
When it was enacted in 1998, the DMCA created four safe harbors based on 
the type of activity an OSP engages in.40  17 U.S.C. § 512 protects OSPs who (1) 
engage in transitory digital network communications,41 (2) cache information on 
their systems,42 (3) have information residing on systems or networks at the 
direction of users,43 or (4) refer or link users to an online location containing 
infringing material, may qualify for protection if they meet the conditions set 
forth in each subsection.44  
 
driven solutions such as infringement detection and indemnification policies against users over 
limitations on OSP liability), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED387135.pdf. 
35 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 19. 
36 Id.  
37 H.R REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 21 (1998). 
38 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 2. 
39 See id. at 44-45 (discussing the knowledge standard under the DMCA using common 
law terms like actual knowledge and “red flag” knowledge). 
40 Id. at 19.  
41 17 U.S.C. § 512(a). 
42 See id. § 512(b) (defining caching as the “immediate and temporary storage of material 
on the system of network controlled or operated by or for the service provider.”). 
43 Id. § 512(c). 
44 Id. § 512(d). 
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Before an OSP or company can qualify for safe harbor protection, however, 
the OSP must meet the statutory definition of a “service provider.”45  The OSP 
must also adapt and reasonably implement a policy for terminating a user’s 
subscription and suspending that user’s access to the OSP’s system or network 
“in appropriate circumstances.”46  Further, OSPs must take steps to inform their 
users of the policy.47  Congress, however, did not intend the policy requirement 
to impose a duty to investigate possible infringements, monitor its service, or act 
as an arbiter determining whether the user’s conduct legally constitutes 
infringement.48  The policy meant to put those users who “repeatedly and 
flagrantly” use the service to “disrespect” the intellectual property rights of 
others on notice that their access to the service or Internet, in general, may be 
suspended.49 
Further, the statute requires that the OSP accommodates and does not 
interfere with “measures that are used by copyright owners to identify or protect 
copyrighted works.”50  The measures must be developed cooperatively between 
OSPs and rightsholders in an open, fair, and voluntary manner.51  The statute 
requires that the measures be available to any person on reasonable terms and 
without imposing substantial costs or burdens on OSPs.52  The language here 
encourages cooperation between the OSPs and the rightsholders in developing 
tools, like the YouTube detection algorithm, to locate and remove infringing 
content.53  
Clearly lacking, however, is statutory language requiring the service provider 
to unilaterally develop or improve technical measures to detect and prevent 
infringement.54  Instead, Congress deferred to the industry to determine the best 
 
45 Id.  §512(k)(1)(B) defines “service provider” under all other subsections as “a provider 
of online services or network access, or the operator of facilities therefor, and includes an 
entity described in subparagraph (A).”17 U.S.C. §512(k)(1)(A) defines a “service provider” 
specifically under subsection (a) as “an entity offering the transmission, routing, or providing 
of connections for digital online communications, between or among points specified by a 
user, of material of the user’s choosing, without modification to the content of the material as 
sent or received.” 
46 Id. § 512(i)(1)(A). 
47 Id.  
48 See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 52 (1998); H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 61 (1998) 
(discussing the policy requirement behind subsection (i) which was originally subsection (h)). 
49 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 52 (1998).  
50 17 U.S.C. §512(i)(2). 
51 See id. §512(i)(2)(A) (requiring that the policy be “developed pursuant to a broad 
consensus of copyright owners and service providers in an open, fair, voluntary, multi-industry 
standards process”). 
52 Id. §512(i)(2)(B)-(C). 
53 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 20; H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 49. 
54 17 U.S.C. §512(i). 
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practices for preventing infringement.55  While the threat of liability may make 
the bargaining power between rightsholders and OSPs seem unequal, each of the 
safe harbors imposes specific activity-based duties and expectations that level the 
playing field.56  The OSP’s duties vary under each subsection, but we need only 
consider the subsections and duties that apply to Twitch. 
 
1. Twitch’s Potential Copyright Liability and the DMCA’s Antidote 
Twitch is a live streaming service operated by Twitch Interactive, a subsidiary 
of Amazon.57  Livestreams on Twitch cater to many different audiences with 
broadcasters (streamers) playing video games, improvising music, and providing 
political commentary.58  After downloading screen capture software and signing 
up for an account on Twitch, anyone can broadcast content around the globe 
using Twitch’s website and servers.59  Viewers can tune into the channel (a web 
page of the broadcast) where they usually see the broadcaster’s screen, a video 
feed of the broadcaster’s face, and a chat window that they can use to interact 
with other viewers.60  Throughout the stream, the broadcaster may run 
advertisements, which generates revenue for both them and Twitch.61   
The ease of setup and the potential to generate revenue or notoriety make 
Twitch’s platform ripe for misuse.  During the FIFA Club World Cup in January 
2020, three different streams illegally broadcasted one match to over 100,000 
total viewers.62  Unfortunately for Twitch this is not an anomaly,63 and as Twitch 
has grown so has its potential copyright liability.64   
 
55 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 52. 
56 The level of involvement on the part of the OSP generally determines its liability, rights, 
and duties under the DMCA.  For example, an internet service provider has different 
obligations under the DMCA than a website like Twitch or YouTube.  See generally 17 U.S.C. § 
512 (defining the rights and duties of OSPs based on their activity). 
57 Kim, supra note 7. 
58 Hsu, supra note 12 (discussing how 125,000 users tuned into one livestream to watch 
the first 2020 presidential debate).  
59 Quick Start Guide, TWITCH, https://www.twitch.tv/creatorcamp/en/twitch-music-
getting-started/music-on-twitch-quick-start-guide/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2021). 
60 Nick Wingfield, What’s Twitch? Gamers Know, and Amazon Is Spending $1 Billion on It, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 25 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/26/technology/amazon-nears-a-
deal-for-twitch.html. 
61Id.  
62 Cecilia D’Anatasio, Twitch Has Become a Haven for Live Sports Piracy, WIRED (Jan. 15, 2020), 
https://www.wired.com/story/twitch-sports-piracy-streaming/. 
63 Id.  
64 See Shannon Liao, Music is Big on Twitch. Now Record Labels Want It to Pay Up, CNN BUS. 
(Aug. 14, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/14/tech/twitch-record-dmca-copyright-
notices/index.html (discussing Twitch’s potential liability for streamers playing unlicensed 
music during a broadcast). 
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Background music on streams has also caused some major copyright 
headaches65 for Twitch.66  Like YouTube, Twitch initially resorted to taking 
down recordings called Videos On Demand (VODs) or muting portions of the 
VODs.67  More recently though, the crisis came to a head and Twitch forced 
streamers to delete VODs with potential infringing content, resulting in most of 
the recorded content being deleted from the website without an opportunity for 
appeal by content creators.68  Despite Twitch’s acquisition of some licenses for 
a music library, tension remains,69 and Twitch  continues to capitulate to 
rightsholders. 
The final copyright boss still looms on the horizon for Twitch, however, and 
luckily, it’s still asleep.  Most of Twitch’s content is centered around video games 
that are themselves copyrighted works.70  While it may not be thought of 
intuitively as infringement, broadcasting yourself playing a game can be illegal 
 
65 Some headaches are more funny than they are painful.  Recently, Metallica played at 
BlizzCon, which was hosted virtually on Twitch.  However, as the band started to play, the 
live audio was muted and replaced with classical music because Twitch Gaming was worried 
about receiving a DMCA complaint for playing Metallica’s copyrighted music.  Chris Welch, 
Some Viewers of Metallica’s BlizzCon Performance Heard the Least Metal Music Imaginable, THE VERGE 
(Feb. 20, 2021), https://www.theverge.com/2021/2/20/22292790/metallica-blizzcon-2021-
performance-dmca-for-whom-the-bell-tolls.  
66 Id. (discussing Twitch’s difficulty in negotiating a licensing agreement with various 
record labels and how the website has angered creators by forcefully removing content). 
67 How to Appeal Muted Audio, TWITCH, https://help.twitch.tv/s/article/how-to-
appeal-flagged-content?language=en_US (last accessed Apr. 14, 2021); Paul Tassi, Twitch 
DMCA Claims Frustrate Creators Forced to Delete Years of VODs and Clips, FORBES (Jun. 8, 2020), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/paultassi/2020/06/08/twitch-dmca-claims-frustrate-
creators-forced-to-delete-years-of-vods-and-clips/.   
68 Jacob Kastrenakes, Twitch Will Begin Scanning and Deleting Clips that Contain Copyrighted 
Music, THE VERGE (June 11, 2020), https://www.theverge.com/2020/6/11/21288220 
/twitch-scan-clips-copyrighted-music-dmca-takedowns-audible-magic.  
69 Jon Blistein, Twitch Licenses Music Now. But the Music Industry Says It’s Skirting the Rules, 
ROLLING STONE (Oct. 1, 2020), https://www.rollingstone.com/pro/features/twitch-
soundtrack-licensing-sync-1069411. A synchronization license (or synch license) grants the 
right to synchronize the musical composition in timed relation with images or video.  Types of 
Copyright, BMI, https://www.bmi.com/licensing/entry/types_of_copyrights (last visited Mar. 
27, 2021).  This is a different license from a reproduction liceense, which allows the licensee 
to make or store copies of the work.  Id.  Tension remains because rightsholders feel Twitch 
should pay for the more expensive reproduction license rather than the sync license.  See 
Kastrenakes, supra note 67. 
70 Michael Larkey, Cooperative Play: Anticipating the Problem of Copyright Infringement in the New 
Business of Live Video Game Webcasts, 13 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 52, 57-58 (2015).  Video 
game developers may also independently license popular music to play within the game and 
separately license the original soundtrack to a game.  See, e.g., The Music of Grand Theft Auto V, 
WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Music_of_Grand_Theft_Auto_V (last visited 
Mar. 27, 2021) (discussing the mix of licensed and original music included in Grand Theft 
Auto V). 
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copyright infringement.71  Fortunately, game developers typically license the 
ability to stream their game whenever someone purchases it.72  Generally, this 
practice is mutually beneficial for streamers, game developers, and Twitch 
because the game gains popularity, sales increase, and the broadcast generates 
revenue for Twitch and streamers.73 
This licensing ecosystem functions well, but it is fragile.  Game developers 
are free at any time to change the terms of their end-user license agreement or 
to revoke streaming privileges.74  Any change to the current licensing scheme 
would be catastrophic for Twitch.  For example, if Activision wanted to launch 
its own streaming platform, it could prohibit people from streaming Call of Duty: 
Warzone, on Twitch.75  While it’s unlikely that game developers would destabilize 
the current licensing scheme, any changes to the DMCA’s safe harbors that give 
rightsholders more leverage could prompt such a change.  Fortunately, though, 
the current Section 512 allows Twitch to avoid all forms of copyright liability and 
thrive as a media outlet. 
 
2. How Does Twitch Qualify for Section 512 Safe Harbor 
While Twitch arguably fits into any one of the safe harbors listed in 
subsections (a), (b), or (c), it most likely avoids liability under subsection (c).76  
Subsection (c) of Section 512 provides relief where infringing material is stored 
on the OSP’s server or network at the direction of a user.77  Because streamers 
initiate the broadcast and subsequent storage of video on Twitch’s servers,78 
 
71 Larkey, supra note 71, at 59-61. 
72 Id. at 57-58.  
73 Id. at 58. 
74 Id. Although this is an evolving area in the context of videogames, it is generally 
practiced by other large companies and generally accepted where the right to unilaterally 
change the terms is reserved in the original contract.  Peter A. Alces & Michael M. Greenfield, 
They Can Do What!? Limitations on the Use of Change-or-Terms Clauses, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1099, 
1103-06 nn.12-16 (2010).  
75 While this may seem unlikely, the same fate has already befallen Netflix and the market 
for streaming TV shows and movies.  See Julia Alexander, Streaming Was Part of the Future – Now 
It’s the Only Future, THE VERGE (Oct. 28, 2020), https://www.theverge.com/21536842/ 
streaming-disney-hbo-max-peacock-cbs-all-access-warnermedia-viacom-nbcuniversal 
(discussing competition within the streaming space that was previous dominated by Netflix).   
76 It could be argued that Twitch merely “transmits or routes” the streamer’s broadcast 
through its servers to each viewer, qualifying it for safe harbor under 17 U.S.C. § 512(a). 
Alternatively, § 512(b) could apply if the broadcast data was stored temporarily on Twitch’s 
server.  Because Twitch makes recordings of the broadcast accessible for fourteen days, Twitch 
is most likely to qualify for safe harbor under subsection (c).  Michael Larkey, Cooperative Play: 
Anticipating the Problem of Copyright Infringement in the New Business of Live Video Game Webcasts, 13 
RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 52, 79-81 (2015).   
77 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1). 
78 Video on Demand, TWITCH, https://help.twitch.tv/s/article/video-on-demand?language 
=en_US (last visited Mar. 27, 2021). 
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Twitch can qualify for safe harbor under subsection (c) as long as it meets the 
statutory conditions. 
In order to qualify for safe harbor under subsection (c), Twitch must have a 
“designated agent” for receiving notifications of claimed infringement and 
provide the agent’s contact information to the public.79  Like most large internet 
media companies, Twitch provides its agent’s contact information along with 
guidelines for submitting a DMCA notification.80  The notifications themselves 
must meet certain statutory requirements that Twitch details on its DMCA 
Guidelines page.81  Based on its DMCA policy, Twitch will qualify for safe harbor 
under subsection (c) of Section 512 unless one of the exceptions in subsection 
(c)(1)(A) applies.  
While the elements of subsection (c)(1) are phrased as negative limitations, 
each of the elements can be rephrased as a positive exception.82  Doing so makes 
it easier to see how the statutory language mirrors the common law standards of 
contributory infringement and vicarious liability, which Congress intended to 
preserve under the DMCA.83   
Subsection (c)(1)(A)(i)-(iii) prevents the application of the safe harbor when 
OSPs like Twitch have actual or “red flag” knowledge of infringing activity and 
fail to timely remove or restrict access to the infringing content.84  Courts have, 
traditionally, applied an almost identical test to hold defendants contributorily 
liable for infringing activity.85 
Additionally, OSPs may be held liable if they “receive a financial benefit 
attributable to infringing activity” and have the “right and ability to control” the 
activity.86  Once again, this standard maps almost directly onto the common law 
standard used to hold defendants vicariously liable.87  Thus, it is beneficial to 
 
79 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2). 
80 Digital Millennium Copyright Act Notification Guidelines, TWITCH (Mar. 27, 2019), 
https://www.twitch.tv/p/legal/dmca-guidelines. See also Rules and Policies: Copyright, YOUTUBE 
https://www.youtube.com/howyoutubeworks/policies/copyright (last visited Mar. 27, 2021) 
(outlining YouTube’s copyright policy and directing visitors to a webform to submit a 
notification). 
81 Id. The notification must, among other things, (1) identify the copyrighted work claimed 
to have been infringed, (2) identify the infringing material or subject of infringing activity that 
is to be removed, (3) certify that the information is accurate, and (4) certify that the allegation 
was made in good faith.  17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(i)-(vi). 
82 The Senate and House reports also support this interpretation. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-
551, pt. 2, at 53-54; S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 44-45 (1998) (describing the circumstances where 
an OSP would lose protection). 
83 See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 19 (“Rather than embarking upon a wholesale clarification 
of these doctrines, the Committee decided to leave current law in its evolving state . . . .”). 
84 17 U.S.C. §512(c)(1)(A)(i)-(iii). 
85 See discussion infra Section II.b.2. 
86 17 U.S.C. §512(c)(1)(B). 
87 See discussion infra Section II.b.1. 
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understand the history and policies behind vicarious liability and contributory 
infringement before those theories of indirect liability can be examined in the 
context of the DMCA. 
B. A BRIEF HISTORY OF INDIRECT THEORIES OF LIABILITY 
Indirect theories of liability have been around much longer than the 
internet.88  Contributory infringement and vicarious liability originate from tort 
and agency law89 and were used to hold those who assisted, but did not personally 
duplicate the copyrighted work, liable for infringement.90  The original 
justifications behind these theories of liability is important to understanding how 
the courts have shaped the doctrines to the digital world and shaped them under 
the DMCA and Section 512. 
 
1. Vicarious Liability 
Vicarious liability was born out of the doctrine of respondeat superior and was 
initially used to hold employers liable for the conduct of their employees.91  The 
doctrine has been extended into the online world to hold liable any defendant 
OSP who has (1) the “right and ability to supervise” the direct infringer and (2) 
an “obvious and direct financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted 
materials.”92  In modern litigation, advertising revenue and sales data make it 
easier to demonstrate that the defendant OSP received a financial benefit from 
the infringing activity.93  While there are circumstances where the financial 
benefit is unclear, most cases turn on the relationship between the defendant and 
 
88 See Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Unwinding Sony, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 941, 996-1005 
(2007) (discussing the origins of indirect theories of copyright liability during the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries).  
89 See MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §12.04[A][1] 
(Matthew Bender ed., 2021) (explaining how the doctrines of tort and agency law have shaped 
what types of relationships and circumstances justifying holding a defendant liable). 
90 Id. at 3.  
91 Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement Without 
Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1366 (2004). 
92 Shapiro v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963). 
93 See A&M Recs. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1023 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing how 
potential for user-derived revenue can support finding a financial interest where infringing 
content draws users to the website or service); MGM Studios Inc., v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 
1154, 1164 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[D]irect financial benefit, via advertising revenue, [is] undisputed 
in this case.”), rev’d, 545 U.S. 913 (reversing based on lack of substantial no infringing use) 
(citing Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).  In earlier decisions, 
courts were less willing to find a financial benefit where the defendant did not receive a more 
direct financial benefit from the infringing content.  See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom Online 
Commc’n Servs., 907 F.Supp. 1361, 1377 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that attracting new 
subscribers who generate potential advertisement revenue did not justify finding a direct 
financial benefit).  
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the direct infringer, particularly the amount of control exercised by the defendant 
over the direct infringer.94 
Characterization of the relationship between the defendant OSP and the 
infringing user has proven to be a thorny endeavor for courts.  In an early case 
under the DMCA statutory regime, A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., the court held 
Napster vicariously liable for the infringing conduct of its users because it failed 
to police its system despite being able to locate infringing material.95  Napster’s 
server created a searchable library that allowed users to search for and download 
illegal copies of songs stored on another user’s computer.96  Because Napster 
reserved the right to control access to its system, the Ninth Circuit required it to 
exercise its policing power to remove detectable instances of infringement that 
could be located using the search function.97  Ultimately, Napster failed to 
adequately police its system, and the Ninth Circuit held it vicariously liable.98 
Under the DMCA statutory regime, courts have started requiring something 
more than the mere ability to locate or control content because the statute 
requires OSPs to control content in order to qualify for safe harbor.99  For 
instance, in Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., the defendant, Cybernet, hosted 
a network of websites and required the websites meet certain layout, appearance, 
and image format criteria to become a member of the network.100  Because 
Cybernet closely controlled the sites and actively policed them for compliance 
with the network requirements, the court concluded that Cybernet had the right 
and ability to control and could be held vicariously liable for infringing 
content.101 
Most of these cases turn on the defendant’s ability to “substantially influence” 
or control the infringing activity but failing to exercise that control.102  Much like 
the traditional principal-agent context, vicarious liability places potential liability 
on the OSPs (the principal) because they usually are the least cost avoider and in 
 
94 See Fonovisa Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262-63 (1996) (discussing the 
amount of control the Cherry Auction exercised over the swap meet rules and the vendor 
selling duplicated records). 
95 239 F.3d 1004, 1024. 
96 Id. at 1011-13. 
97 Id. at 1023-24.   
98 Id. at 1024. It was also shown in emails that Napster had actual knowledge of the 
infringement. Id. at 1021-24. 
99 Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 31 (2d Cir. 2012).  By adhering to the 
statute and issuing takedowns, OSPs would effectively concede that they have the requisite 
control, rendering them vicariously liable for any infringing conduct of their users. Id.  
100 213 F. Supp.2d 1146, 1173-74 (C.D. Cal.) (2004). 
101 Id at 1174. 
102 Id at 1173.  
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the best position to stop the infringing activity.103  As discussed above, Congress 
intended vicarious liability to continue to operate under the DMCA.104  Because 
OSPs are required to exercise control to qualify for the safe harbors, however, it 
becomes difficult to determine when an OSP should be held liable under the 
512(c)(1)(B) exceptions. 105 
Knowledge of infringing activity or circumstances indicating ongoing 
infringement would seemingly trigger liability because the OSP clearly failed to 
exercise control over the user and prevent the infringement.  Courts, however, 
have not considered knowledge, actual or constructive, as “something more” 
that will trigger vicarious liability.106  Knowledge has traditionally been 
considered under the contributory infringement.107  Thus, in cases where 
knowledge is present, courts will not predicate vicarious liability on actual 
knowledge or constructive knowledge and instead turn to the contributory 
infringement doctrine.108 
 
2. Contributory Infringement 
The theory of contributory infringement originated from the tort concept of 
enterprise liability.109  In tort law, tortfeasors who contribute to a tortious act are 
held jointly and severally liable with the primary tortfeasor.110  This serves to 
disincentivize arm’s length participation in tortious conduct and ensure a full 
recovery.111  The doctrine’s extension to copyright law was intended to serve the 
same purposes by allowing plaintiffs to sue those who assisted “fly-by-night 
 
103 Sverker K. Hogberg, Note, The Search for Intent-Based Doctrines of Secondary Liability in 
Copyright Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 909, 915-16 (2006) (citing Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of 
Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231, 1280 n.142 (1984)). 
104 See discussion supra Section II.  
105 Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 30 (2d Cir. 2012). 
106 Id. at 38 (“[T]hese examples involve a service provider exerting substantial influence on 
the activities of users, without . . . acquiring knowledge of specific infringing activity.”). 
107 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §12.04[A][2] 
(Matthew Bender ed., 2021). 
108 See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 940 F.Supp. 2d 110 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding 
that “knowledge of the prevalence of infringing activity, and welcoming it, does not itself 
forfeit the safe harbor.  To forfeit that, the provider must influence or participate in the 
infringement.”). 
109 NIMMER, supra note 111, § 12.04[A][3]. 
110 Liability may be apportioned among two or more parties or to only one or a few select 
members of the group of tortfeasors. Joint and Several Liability, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th 
ed. 2019). 
111 See Nancy C. Marcus, Phantom Parties and Other Practical Problems with the Attempted 
Abolition of Joint and Several Liability, 60 ARK. L. REV. 437, 438-39 (2007) (discussing the policy 
of ensuring a full recovery that is used to justify joint and several liability). 
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record pirates” to ensure a fuller recovery and discourage participation in 
infringement schemes.112 
Contributory infringement is generally applied (1) where the defendant’s 
personal conduct knowingly furthers the infringement and (2) where the 
defendant provides the means of infringement with knowledge that the means 
will be used to infringe copyrights.113  In most cases involving an OSP defendant, 
or tech innovators in general, it can be readily shown that the OSP provided the 
means of infringement because the OSP’s technology can be used in infringing 
activity.114  Thus, the extent of the defendant OSP’s liability turns on whether 
the defendant OSP had knowledge of the infringing use. 
In order to hold a defendant liable, Courts require that the defendant have 
actual knowledge of the infringing activity or reason to know infringement is 
occurring, which is usually referred to as constructive or “red flag” knowledge.115  
Typically actual knowledge turns on whether the defendant “actually or 
‘subjectively’ knew of specific infringement.”116  Conversely, “red flag” 
knowledge is charged when the defendant was “subjectively aware of facts that 
would [make] the specific infringement ‘objectively’ obvious to a reasonable 
person.”117 
Public policy has cautioned against finding requisite knowledge, however, 
because potential copyright liability would suppress innovation, a paradigm that 
the Supreme Court established in Sony v. Universal.118  In Sony, Universal wanted 
to hold Sony liable under a theory of contributory infringement because 
customers were using Sony’s Betamax video recorders to record Universal’s 
television shows.119  Drawing on the idea that the Copyright Act of 1976 
provides only statutory monopoly rights, the Court recognized that the 1976 Act 
should be enforced to encourage and promote creative works.120  The Court held 
that copyright should not allow rightsholders to condemn new technologies 
merely because of their potential for infringement.121  Because Betamax was 
capable of significant non-infringing uses, the Court held that Sony lacked 
 
112 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §12.04[A][3][a] 
(Matthew Bender ed., 2021). 
113 Id.  
114 See generally Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 422-23 (1984) 
(demonstrating how the Betamax could be used to record television shows); Viacom Int’l, Inc. 
v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 28 (2d Cir. 2012) (demonstrating how YouTube’s users could 
upload infringing content to the site). 
115 Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971). 
116 Viacom, 676 F.3d at 31.  
117 Id. 
118 464 U.S. 417. 
119 Id. at 419.  
120 Id. at 439-42. 
121 Id. 
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constructive knowledge of the infringing use and did not hold Sony liable as a 
contributory infringer.122    
While the DMCA superseded the Court’s decision in Sony concerning OSPs, 
the policies behind the decision heavily influenced the DMCA and are reflected 
in its application.123  The Court in Sony recognized that copyright owners should 
not  weaponize their rights to prevent the development of new and useful 
technologies.124  At the same time, rightsholders should still be able to enforce 
their copyrights and hold innovators liable under a theory of contributory 
infringement.125  The DMCA balanced the policies articulated in Sony by granting 
safe harbors to OSPs while leaving room for contributory infringement to be 
applied.126 
Despite the statutory language of the DMCA, courts have struggled to 
determine when there is sufficient knowledge to hold a defendant OSP liable.127  
It has been particularly difficult to determine when “red flag” knowledge is 
sufficient to impose affirmative duties to either take down content or inquire 
further. In some cases, even actual knowledge of infringement was not enough 
to impose liability.128  
The doctrine of willful blindness compounds the problem by allowing 
plaintiffs to impute knowledge to the OSP if it willfully avoided knowledge of 
specific instances of infringement.129  Section 512 does not mention willful 
blindness, but courts have applied the doctrine under the DMCA despite 
 
122 Id. at 442-56. While the logic used to find potential for non-infringing use has been 
questioned, the underlying policy reasoning remains sound today.  See generally Thomas V. 
Nachbar, Monopoly, Mercantilism, and the Politics of Regulation, 91 VA. L. REV. 1313, 1378-79 (2005) 
(discussing how legislative monopoly rights have traditionally been used to further certain 
public policies or objectives and suggesting caution in extending intellectual property rights 
further than the legislature intended). 
123 Compare Sony, 464 U.S. at 440-42 (discussing how copyright should not be used to 
hinder the introduction of beneficial technologies) with S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 2 (1998) (citing 
Sony, 464 U.S. at 417) (discussing the intention of balancing copyright enforcement with the 
introduction of socially beneficial technologies that may be used to facilitate infringement).  
124 See Sony, 464 U.S. at 442 (discussing balancing the exclusive copyrights with “the right 
of others to freely engage” in commerce, such as developing new technologies and creating 
new markets). 
125 Id.  
126 See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 2 (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 417); id. at 8-9 (discussing how 
actual knowledge and red flag knowledge should be applied under the DMCA). 
127 See generally John Blevins, Uncertainty as Enforcement Mechanism: The New Expansion of 
Secondary Copyright Liability to Internet Platforms, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1821, 1837-1840, 1847-48 
(2013) (discussing how judicial application of the knowledge standard has changed over time). 
128 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., SECTION 512 OF TITLE 17: A REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF 
COPYRIGHTS 119-21 (2020), https://www.copyright.gov/policy/section512/section-512-full-
report.pdf. 
129 Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 34-35 (2d Cir. 2012). 
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lingering incongruencies.130  Courts have struggled, however, to strike a balance 
between the affirmative duty imposed by the willful blindness doctrine to 
investigate and Section 512(m).  The lack of consistency suggests OSPs have no 
affirmative investigative duties under Section 512.131  This has led to some 
puzzling results. 
In Viacom International Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., emails from YouTube’s executives 
indicated that they were aware that infringement was occurring on the site.132  
This included clips and full episodes of television shows and live sporting 
events.133  The Second Circuit remanded the case to determine whether 
YouTube had actual or “red flag” knowledge of infringing activity on its site or 
whether YouTube was willfully blind.134  On remand, however, the District 
Court held that, even though YouTube was generally aware of the infringement 
on its site, YouTube could not be held liable because “specific locations of 
infringements [were] not supplied.”135   
Further, citing subsection(m) the District Court declined to impose any 
affirmative duty on YouTube to search for the allegedly infringing materials 
based on willful blindness.136  Drawing on the Second Circuit’s discussion, the 
District Court held that 512(m) prevents imposing an affirmative duty to remove 
infringing content, without specific knowledge of the infringing activity, such as 
its location.137  Thus, OSPs could only be held liable if they are aware of “specific 
and identifiable instances of infringement” and fail to investigate further or remove 
the content.138   
The result in Viacom may seem inequitable to rightsholders, but the 
allegations should be given context.  Even though the alleged material remained 
on YouTube’s website, YouTube previously responded to more than 100,000 
DMCA takedown requests from Viacom alone and quickly removed the 
identified content.139  Moreover, at the time, almost twenty-four hours of video 
 
130 See id. at 35 (reasoning that the statutory language, particularly the language in 
subsection (m), does not preclude application of the willful blindness doctrine under the 
DMCA). 
131 Courts have not specifically addressed interplay between subsection(m) and the 
language in 17 U.S.C. §512(c)(1)(A)(iii), which provides that “upon obtaining such knowledge 
or awareness, [the OSP must] act[] expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material.”   
Although subsection(m) precludes imposition of any affirmative duties, the language in 
subsection (c)(1)(A)(iii) seems, on its face, to impose an affirmative duty to restrict access to 
infringing material only when the OSP has specific knowledge of the infringement. 
132 676 F.3d 19, at 33-34. 
133 Id.  
134 Id. at 41-42. 
135 Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube Inc., 940 F.Supp. 2d 110, 115-17 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
136 Id. at 116.  
137 Id. 
138 Viacom, 676 F.3d at 32. 
139 YouTube, 940 F.Supp. 2d at 110. 
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were uploaded to YouTube every minute.140  With such a large amount of data, 
the District Court concluded that it would be inequitable to require YouTube to 
find and remove the infringing clips without some indication of their location.141 
In the vacuum of litigation, where allegations of infringement are limited to 
specific instances, it may seem incongruous to not hold the defendant OSP liable 
when it is generally aware of the infringement.  Moreover, evidence of actual or 
“red flag” knowledge and the OSP’s ability to control its service seemingly justify 
applying vicarious liability.  These inconsistencies are a driving force behind the 
push to reform the DMCA’s knowledge standard, and while they may seem like 
Congressional oversights, they’re intentional.142 
III. THE WOLF IN SHEEP’S CLOTHING: LOWERING THE KNOWLEDGE 
STANDARD   
Congress intended the DMCA to be a stepping off point from which 
rightsholders and OSPs would embark on a cooperative venture to curb 
copyright infringement on the internet.143  In the intervening decades, however, 
it has become increasingly difficult to sift through days worth of data and root 
out infringing content.144  This difficulty has led to seemingly inequitable results 
under the knowledge standard where the OSP has some ability to control content 
and general knowledge that infringement is occurring but fails to remove the 
illegal content.145 
Accordingly, the Copyright Office has recommended that Congress consider 
amending the DMCA’s knowledge standard to clarify the circumstances where 
an OSP has failed its duties under the DMCA and should be held liable.146  These 
amendments would shift the balance of the DMCA strongly in favor of 
rightsholders in a way that would be devastating for OSPs like Twitch.  Twitch, 
in particular, would not be able to operate under the proposed changes and be 
forced out of business, stifling the very creativity Copyright seeks to promote.   
 
140 Id. at 114. Unsurprisingly, this number has continued to increase with almost 500 hours 
of video uploaded to YouTube each minute in 2019. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., supra note 18, at 
9-10. 
141 See YouTube, 940 F.Supp. 2d at 114-15 (drawing on legislative history, the District Court 
concluded that the DMCA was intended to prevent liability in situations where the OSP was 
not specifically aware of the infringing material). 
142 See discussion infra Section III.  
143 H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 21 (1998). 
144 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., SECTION 512 OF TITLE 17: A REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF 
COPYRIGHTS 10 (2020), https://www.copyright.gov/policy/section512/section-512-full-
report.pdf. 
145 Id. at 10-11. 
146 Id. at 3-4. 
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Application of the current knowledge standard may seem like a failure on 
Congress’s part to lay out how the doctrines of secondary liability were meant to 
interact with the DMCA.  The courts, however, have correctly applied the 
doctrines and not held the OSPs liable where there is only general knowledge of 
infringement.  The DMCA was intended to define the extent of the OSP’s duties, 
specifically that there is no affirmative duty to search for and locate infringing 
content.147  The language of the DMCA indicates that Congress believed 
rightsholders were in the best position to identify the infringing content while 
OSPs should remove that content.148   
Although these amendments would deter infringement and provide a more 
defined standard for indirect liability in infringement actions, they would merely 
treat a perceived symptom of the underlying problem.  At the heart of the U.S. 
Copyright Office’s report is the growing difficulty of locating and identifying 
infringing content.149  Both rightsholders and OSPs attribute the failure to one 
another and want the other side to do more.150  Rather than crudely increasing 
liability standards, Congress should pursue changes that will foster cooperation 
between rightsholders and OSPs. 
A. REFORMS PROPOSED BY THE COPYRIGHT OFFICE:  A HARBINGER OF 
THINGS TO COME 
In this section, I will first discuss the proposed amendments to the DMCA’s 
knowledge standard and how the Copyright Office suggests the changes should 
function.  Next, I will discuss how these changes would be catastrophic for OSPs 
like Twitch and destabilize the balance of duties under the DMCA.  Lastly, I will 
demonstrate how the courts have correctly interpreted the knowledge standard 
and suggest that the amendment should focus instead on balancing the burden 
of locating infringing content.  
At the end of a years-long effort, the Copyright Office published its official 
report on the efficacy of the DMCA and recommended significant changes to 
how knowledge of infringing activity should be considered by the courts.151  
More specifically, the report recommended (1) clarifying what constitutes 
“something more” under the vicarious liability standard (2) clarifying the 
distinction between actual and “red flag” knowledge, and (3) enlarging the scope 
of the willful blindness standard.152  These proposed changes are intended to 
 
147 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(m) (precluding application of non-statutory affirmative duties).  
148 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 2. 
149 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., supra note 148, at 9-12 (discussing the changes in the 
technological landscape that led to the report).  
150  Id. at 9-10; 28, n. 125; and 32, n.145. 
151 Id. at 3-4. 
152 Id. 
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correct how courts apply the vicarious liability and contributory infringement 
standards under the DMCA.153  The proposals, however, go too far and will 
upset the balance of the DMCA, destroying its effectiveness and OSPs alike.   
The Copyright Office first proposes removing the “something more” 
requirement imposed by the courts applying vicarious liability and returning to a 
more traditional common law standard.154  While the Copyright Office does not 
suggest significantly expanding the standard,155 it does suggest that the standard 
being applied now is not stringent enough and does not adequately capture non-
compliant OSPs.156  In turn, the Copyright Office recommends that something 
more than a general level of control be required to hold a defendant OSP 
liable.157  The report gestures to early common law standards where contracts 
and close relationships formed the basis for vicarious liability, suggesting that the 
DMCA should apply a similar standard.158  Predicating liability based on a 
contractual or close relationship with end-users would be disastrous for Twitch. 
While users do not have to register for a Twitch account to watch a broadcast, 
they must have an account that is subject to Twitch’s terms of service before 
they can begin streaming.159  As clearly stated in the first sentence of the terms, 
“THIS IS A BINDING CONTRACT.”160  Like most OSPs, Twitch enters into 
a contract with its users where users are granted access or provided a service in 
exchange for a promise to abide by the OSP’s guidelines.161  Among the 
agreement’s provisions, “Twitch reserves the right to remove, screen, or edit” 
any content uploaded to Twitch.162   
A more common-law-like standard would require courts to apply a standard 
similar to the one applied in earlier cases like Napster.163  As discussed above, the 
Ninth Circuit held that reserving the right to remove or edit content and failing 
to exercise that right was sufficient to hold Napster liable under a theory of 
vicarious liability.164   
 
153 Id. at 124-27 (discussing how increasing clarity of what the law is and predictability is a 
goal of these amendments). 
154 See id. at 135 (discussing how the common law standard should be applied, but the 
requisite level of control should be contextualized for OSPs). 
155 Id. at 136.  
156 See id. at 135 (“The Office is unconvinced that Congress . . . intended to abrogate the 
common law standard for right and ability to control to require ‘something more.’”). 
157 Id.  
158 Id.  
159 Terms of Service, TWITCH, https://www.twitch.tv/p/legal/terms-of-service/ (last visited 
Mar. 27, 2021). 
160 Id.  
161 Id. § 1 (“Introduction; Your Agreement to these Terms of Service”). 
162 Id. § 9 (“Prohibited Conduct”). 
163 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 239 F.3d 1004, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001). 
164 Id.; see discussion supra Section II.b.1. 
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Thus, under the proposed amendments, Twitch could be held liable in any 
instance where it fails to remove infringing content because it reserves the right 
to remove content.  Like Napster, Twitch has a search function and access to 
data that can be used to locate infringing streams.165  Further, Twitch is 
undeniably aware that infringement occurs on its site.166  While the infringing 
streams may not represent a majority of the content on Twitch, general 
knowledge of infringement favors holding Twitch liable because it indicates a 
failure to exercise the right to police its website.167   
Returning to such a common-law standard would greatly increase Twitch’s 
potential liability and force it to preemptively take down content.  Even in cases 
where the content in question may not be considered legally infringing under the 
doctrine of fair use, a lower standard of vicarious liability would effectively force 
Twitch to remove it or face liability.  With less streaming content available on 
the site and “views”, Twitch’s revenues from ads and subscriptions would 
decrease.168  Additionally, Twitch’s reputation as a content provider would be 
tarnished,169 further decreasing its traffic and correlated revenues.   
The Copyright Office also proposes reconsidering the courts’ definitions of 
actual and “red flag” knowledge and lowering the knowledge requirements for 
showing willful blindness.170  While the report considers these amendments 
separately, the knowledge standard has serious interplay with the willful 
blindness doctrine.  Raising or lowering the “red flag” or constructive knowledge 
standards will inherently affect when affirmative duties apply under willful 
blindness and form a basis of liability if the OSP fails to investigate. 
 




166 See discussion supra Section II.a.2 (discussing how Twitch seeks protection under the 
DMCA and is therefore regularly notified about infringing streams or videos that are present 
on its website).  
167 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1023 (“Turning a blind eye to detectable acts of infringement for 
the sake of profit gives rise to liability.”). 
168 See Nick Wingfield, What’s Twitch? Gamers Know, and Amazon Is Spending $1 Billion on It, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25 2014) (discussing how unique genres of content like video games 
generate revenue for Twitch based on viewership), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/26/technology/amazon-nears-a-deal-for-twitch.html. 
169 Recent news coverage of Twitch issuing vague takedown notices has not been favorable 
to Twitch, a trend that would presumably continue under a wave of preemptive takedowns.  
Nicole Carpenter, Twitch Streamers Were Issued Tons of DMCA Takedown Notices Today, POLYGON 
(Oct. 20, 2020), https://www.polygon.com/2020/10/20/21525587/twitch-dmca-takedown-
notice-content. 
170 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., SECTION 512 OF TITLE 17: A REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF 
COPYRIGHTS 110 (2020), https://www.copyright.gov/policy/section512/section-512-full-
report.pdf. 
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The Copyright Office takes issue with how courts have declined to apply 
affirmative duties where an OSP is aware that infringement is occurring on its 
website generally but has not received a takedown request.171  The Copyright 
Office suggests that section 512(m) cannot be read to shield OSPs from 
additional non-statutory, affirmative duties.172  The Copyright Office concludes 
that there must be “some circumstances” where, absent a takedown notification, 
an OSP has a duty to investigate further and potentially remove content.173  
Consequently, a failure to investigate further or avoiding knowledge would 
violate the lower willful blindness standard suggested by the Copyright Office.  
The report opines that the subjective actual knowledge standard and 
objective “red flag” knowledge standards, as defined in Viacom, have failed to 
capture these circumstances and let OSPs off the hook.174  To remedy this, the 
Copyright Office proposes defining “red flag” knowledge on a case-by-case basis 
using an OSP’s relevant characteristics, such as size and filtering technologies.175  
In turn, proportional affirmative duties could be circumstantially applied to the 
OSPs. 
First, courts already take the OSPs’ characteristics, such as size and filtering 
technologies, into account when applying the actual and “red flag” knowledge 
standards.176  For example, in Viacom, the Second Circuit emphasized the amount 
of data uploaded and the difficulty of locating the infringing content when it 
discussed YouTube’s general knowledge of infringement.177  Likewise, in Napster, 
the Ninth Circuit specifically discussed how Napster knew that illegal copies of 
songs were regularly uploaded to its website and could easily locate them using 
its own search function.178 
Regardless, defining the knowledge standard on a case-by-case basis reinjects 
the very uncertainty the DMCA was intended to remove back into the copyright 
regime.  For Twitch specifically, it would be difficult to gauge how a particular 
court would consider its growing size, new detection technologies, its policies, 
or other factors because Twitch’s characteristics and capabilities change 
 
171 Id. at 111 n.591, 122-124.  
172 Id. at 111 n.591. 
173 Id. at 111-12 n.591. 
174 Id. at 122-123 (“Such a narrow interpretation of red flag knowledge minimizes an OSP’s 
duty to act upon information of infringement and, in doing so, protects activities that Congress 
did not intend to protect.”). 
175 See id. at 123-124 (proposing that the OSP’s “relevant characteristics” should be taken 
into account when determining the appropriate red flag standard, which will naturally change 
between cases). 
176 Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 32-34 (2d Cir. 2012) (discussing the 
size of YouTube and the amount of content uploaded when deciding whether to hold that 
YouTube had knowledge). 
177 Id. at 28, 31. 
178 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1021-24 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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rapidly.179  Such a standard creates a much larger potential liability, and Twitch 
would, once again, be forced to preemptively remove content that might not be 
considered infringing by the courts.  As discussed above, removing more content 
than necessary or banning streamers to avoid liability would cripple Twitch’s 
revenue and reputation in the marketplace.180 
Likewise, if liability can be applied under the willful blindness doctrine based 
on general knowledge of infringement, Twitch would have to invest significant 
resources into rooting out potentially infringing content.  Twitch would need to 
hire a team of employees to investigate instances of infringement and invest 
significant resources to develop better detection means.  If one stream slipped 
through where a copyrighted video was shown, Twitch could be held liable.  
Extra policing may not directly affect Twitch’s revenue, but it would certainly 
increase its costs and presumably cause some reputational damage for improperly 
removing content.   
Alternatively, sites like Twitch could stop seeking safe harbor under the 
DMCA and Section 512 altogether.181  The amended statute would not provide 
additional protection, so Twitch would have no reason to continue responding 
to takedown requests from rightsholders.  In fact, Twitch would have no 
incentive to put more than a minimal detection algorithm in place or continue 
cooperating with rightsholders.  
These predictions may seem apocalyptic, but Twitch has already begun 
preemptively removing content in response to pressure from the record 
companies.182  It stands to reason that increasing Twitch’s potential liability is 
only going to exasperate the situation and encourage video game developers to 
enter the fray by revoking the ability to stream their game in hopes of getting a 
cut of the revenue.  Other larger OSPs may be able to survive under the proposed 
amendments, but up-and-coming OSPs like Twitch will be lost, and the next 
Twitch or Twitter may never be created. 
 
179 Darren Geeter, Twitch Created a Business Around Watching Video Games – Here’s How 
Amazon has Changed the Service Since Buying It in 2014, CNBC (Feb. 26, 2019) (discussing how 
Twitch has grown rapidly since 2011 and continues to grow), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02 /26/history-of-twitch-gaming-livestreaming-and-
youtube.html. 
180 Music-Related Copyright Claims and Twitch, TWITCH: BLOG (Nov. 11, 2020), 
https://blog.twitch.tv/en/2020/11/11/music-related-copyright-claims-and-twitch 
(addressing growing frustrations from streamers about Twitch’s shift in DMCA policy). 
181 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., SECTION 512 OF TITLE 17: A REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF 
COPYRIGHTS 10 (2020) (discussing how other OSPs have threatened to stop complying with 
the DMCA), https://www.copyright.gov/policy/section512/section-512-full-report.pdf . 
182  See Music-Related Copyright Claims and Twitch, supra note 176 (“[R]ight now your only 
options, if you think [the clips] contain unauthorized music, is to either go through them one 
by one, or, for Clips, use the ‘delete all’ tool we’ve provided.”). 
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B. “THERE’S A SECOND STAGE”:  SENATOR TILLIS’S PROPOSED REFORMS TAKE 
THE COPYRIGHT OFFICE’S SUGGESTIONS TO A NEW LEVEL 
While the proposed changes are not law yet, Senator Tom Tillis recently 
drafted reforms to the DMCA that lower the knowledge requirement for OSPs 
to take advantage of safe harbors.183  Specifically, Senator Tillis defines “red flag” 
knowledge very generally as, “facts or circumstances from which infringing 
activity is likely.”184  This definition goes even further than the Copyright Office 
suggestion and would hold OSPs liable whenever they have general knowledge 
of infringement.  Further, Senator Tillis’s draft legislation supports application 
of a duty to investigate based on general knowledge of infringement.185 
These changes would make the proposed nightmare a reality. While “facts 
and circumstances from which infringing activity is likely” could be narrowly 
interpreted by the courts to mean “specific knowledge,” it is unlikely because 
“apparent” has been changed to “likely,” suggesting a lower standard.186  Twitch 
could presumably be held liable if it had any indication that infringement might 
be occurring on its site.  Thus, if an employee happened to be watching a stream 
and encountered potentially infringing content,187 Twitch may be held liable 
under Senator Tillis’s proposal.  
Senator Tillis does propose that the Register of Copyright establish 
reasonable best practices for OSPs based on their size and type of service every 
five years, which may alleviate some potential liability if OSPs follow the 
procedures mandated by the Register.188  There is no guarantee, however, that 
these procedures will catch all the facts and circumstances which indicate 
infringement may be occurring.189  Thus, Senator Tillis’s draft does exactly what 
 
183 Tillis Releases Landmark Discussion Draft to Reform the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 
THOM TILLIS, U.S. SENATOR FOR NORTH CAROLINA (Dec. 22, 2020), 
https://www.tillis.senate.gov/2020/12/tillis-releases-landmark-discussion-draft-to-reform-
the-digital-millennium-copyright-act. 
184 Discussion Draft for Stakeholder Comments Only, THOM TILLIS, U.S. SENATOR FOR NORTH 
CAROLINA 2 (Dec. 18, 2020) (emphasis added), https://www.tillis.senate.gov/services/files/ 
97A73ED6-EBDF-4206-ADEB-6A745015C14B. 
185 See id. (adding language in 17 U.S.C. § 512 (a)(2)(B)(ii) to ensure willful blindness will 
be applied if the OSP fails to act on facts or circumstances that indicate infringement is 
occurring). 
186 Compare id. with 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii). 
187 See discussion supra note 22. 
188 See Discussion Draft for Stakeholder Comments Only, supra note 180, at 3. Establishing 
“reasonable best practices” alone would not severely burden Twitch compared to a change in 
the knowledge standard.  While I would certainly like to see my solution adopted, this proposal 
is a good solution because it uses a third-party government agency to delineate the duties of 
OSPs and rightsholders under the DMCA, which addresses the problem rather than merely 
shifting the burden to OSPs.   
189 Senator Tillis proposes having the user verify that they are authorized to upload the 
content, either as the owner or through a license.  Id. It’s highly unlikely that this would do 
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the Copyright Office proposes.  It shifts the burden of uncovering infringing 
content to OSPs, which has the potential to destroy Twitch and other OSPs if it 
becomes law.190 
IV. COOPERATIVE PLAY:  CONGRESS SHOULD SEEK TO FOSTER 
COOPERATION BETWEEN OSPS AND RIGHTSHOLDERS 
A. HIGH BAR FOR INDIRECT LIABILITY: BUG OR FEATURE? 
The problem with applying secondary liability theories is not the statutory 
language of the DMCA or the standards themselves.  Indeed, the standards are 
functioning as Congress intended.  The duties imposed under the DMCA were 
intended to be a high-water mark for duties that could be imposed by courts 
because OSPs would be unable to develop and thrive without significant liability 
protection.191  The policies first laid out in Sony and subsequently codified in the 
DMCA favor protecting OSPs as a default because of the value they represent, 
especially to copyright.   
Every broadcast on Twitch is a copyrightable work that stimulates creativity 
and online culture across the world, not just the United States.  While there 
certainly is some infringement on the site, it represents a small portion of the 
content on Twitch overall.  Increasing Twitch’s liability and forcing it to 
preemptively remove content may protect some copyrighted works from 
infringement, but it will hinder the creation of copyrightable works overall.  A 
small shift in the knowledge standard would allow current rightsholders to stifle 
other creators even if the copyrighted work is not legally infringed.   
The perceived unfairness that results when applying the vicarious liability and 
contributory infringement standards under the DMCA remains, however.  This 
is largely because the traditional concepts of knowledge and control do not 
translate to the scale of the internet.  For example, before the internet, applying 
a secondary theory of liability might have held a movie theatre liable for showing 
a pirated copy of a movie or a flea market operator for leasing space to someone 
known to sell counterfeit records.192  It was relatively easy to demonstrate that 
the owner or operator of the premises knew about the infringement or should 
have known due to some unusual circumstance.  In either case, it seems equitable 
to then place a burden or duty on the owner to stop the infringer before the 
 
anything as users already agree not to upload content that they do not own.  See Terms of Service, 
supra note 156. 
190 The draft does not distribute any additional burden to rightsholders.  Tillis Releases 
Landmark Discussion Draft to Reform the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, supra note 183. 
191 See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8-9, 21 (1998) (limiting copyright liability so that OSPs can 
develop rather than be crushed by the uncertainty of copyright liability). 
192 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §12.04[A][2]-[3] 
(Matthew Bender ed., 2021). 
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rightsholder could be harmed any further.  The infringer is readily identifiable 
and kicking the vendor to the proverbial curb or destroying a pirated copy is not 
a difficult task.  If the owner or operator failed to take action, liability should be 
extended to the owner because her failure to act caused the rightsholder further 
injury.   
Imagine now that the flea market had a million booths or that the theatre 
showed hundreds of thousands of movies at once.  While the owner in those 
situations may be aware that infringement is occurring somewhere on the 
premises, it becomes exponentially more difficult for her to identify and stop the 
movie or remove the vendor.  Placing a burden or duty on the owner in such a 
situation would be extremely inequitable because it is not clear she could have 
done anything to prevent the infringement.  In such a situation, even if the owner 
had the means to quickly stop the infringement activity, the owner would need 
to have more specific knowledge about the infringement before the court would 
impose a duty.   
Obviously, no such flea market or movie theatre exists let alone precedent 
that comprehends such a situation, but OSPs are essentially digital versions of 
incomprehensibly large movie theatres or record stores.  In Viacom, the Second 
Circuit recognized the amount of data that YouTube would have to comb 
through with only limited knowledge of the work that was allegedly being 
infringed.193  The Second Circuit correctly recognized this problem as well when 
it declined to impose an affirmative duty on YouTube.194  Even absent the 
language of subsection (m), the Second Circuit could have drawn on common 
law principles to decide not to hold YouTube liable.  Instead, the court assumed 
that Congress considered the imposition of any affirmative duties in such 
situations when it included subsection (m), preventing affirmative duties from 
being applied under the DMCA.195  
The language may seem ripe with oversight, but it functions as Congress 
intended.  By securing cooperation from OSPs, rightsholders would be able to 
police infringing content (a duty of the rightsholder) through DMCA takedown 
requests.  The OSPs, in turn, would remove the content and adjudicate any 
subsequent appeals from the user who uploaded the content in the first place.  
In exchange, the OSPs are granted protection from claims of indirect 
infringement absent some circumstance where the OSP knowingly permits 
infringement to continue, which is consistent with the common law doctrines. 
In effect, the DMCA acts as a high-water mark for OSP liability, delineating 
the few circumstances where an OSP should be held liable.  The DMCA was 
 
193 Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 28 (2d Cir. 2012). 
194 See id. at 34-35 (discussing how the DMCA does not permit application of a duty to 
monitor).  This is equitable, especially in relation to YouTube, which at the time had twenty-
four hours of video uploaded every minute.  Id. at 28. 
195 Id. at 34-35. 
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designed to provide a solid foundation for OSPs to build on and certainty that, 
as long as they cooperated with rightsholders in good faith, they would not face 
liability.196  Twenty years later, it is clear that the DMCA has served its purpose 
and facilitated growth for OSPs while protecting the interests of rightsholders.  
It’s time, however, to address the growing pains. 
B. TREATING THE DISEASE, NOT THE SYMPTOM 
Results under the knowledge standard are a flare-up of the rising tension 
between OSPs and rightsholders.  The DMCA has equipped both sides with 
tools to facilitate the removal of infringing content without antagonistic demand 
letters and courtroom battles.  It has not, however, provided a means to 
determine who is responsible or in the best position to locate the infringing 
content on the OSPs’ networks or websites.   
Traditionally, rightsholders have borne the burden of identifying the 
infringement and bringing the counterfeiters and those complicit in the scheme 
to court to recover damages.197  In the online world though, rightsholders must 
invest significantly to protect their works.  Of course, large companies and 
organizations like the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) have the 
resources to do so, but smaller creators, like Twitch streamers, simply cannot 
police the entire internet on their own.198 
Conveniently, OSPs provide an excellent scapegoat that is capable of bearing 
such a burden.  Under the traditional theories of vicarious liability and 
contributory infringement, OSPs represent the least-cost avoider.199  They are 
the most familiar with their technology and in the best position to assist and 
protect rightsholders.  Placing the entire burden on OSPs, however, would be an 
unprecedented shift in copyright law and could place potentially ruinous costs 
on them.  Likewise, shifting liability onto OSPs, as the Copyright Office 
recommends in the lowering of the knowledge standard, will only inflame the 
situation and cause it to deteriorate further.  Congress should instead require 
 
196 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1) (explaining that an OSP which expeditiously responds to a 
takedown notice and does not have knowledge of infringement cannot be held liable for 
copyright infringement). 
197 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., SECTION 512 OF TITLE 17: A REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF 
COPYRIGHTS 12-14 (2020) (discussing how rightsholders have traditionally pursued infringers 
independently), https://www.copyright.gov/policy/section512/section-512-full-report.pdf. 
198 See Id. at 10-11 (discussing how large companies and organizations outsource detection 
while smaller creators have difficulty policing infringement of their works online). 
199 See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc, 464 U.S. 417, 437 (1984) (“In such cases, 
as in other situations in which the imposition of vicarious liability is manifestly just, the 
‘contributory’ infringer was in a position to control the use of copyrighted works by others 
and had authorized the use without permission from the copyright owner.”). 
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OSPs to provide rightsholders access to their Application Programming 
Interfaces (“APIs”) and back-end storage. 
C. EXPANDING RIGHTSHOLDER’S ACCESS TO OSPS’ DETECTION TOOLS 
Providing rightsholders access to the OSPs’ APIs and back-end storage 
would hand over the OSPs’ unique abilities to sift through or sort content to the 
rightsholders.  Moreover, it is entirely consistent with the DMCA regime as it 
stands currently under subsection (i)(2).  With carefully crafted legislation 
Congress can protect OSP trade secrets and determine the types of access that 
should be afforded to rightsholders.  In the event there is a disagreement, 
Congress can provide for closed arbitration and terms under which disputes 
should be settled.  In the end, rightsholders would have all the tools necessary to 
locate the infringing content and report it to the OSP with a DMCA takedown 
requests. 
Currently, rightsholders may create tools for detecting infringing content and 
ask (or demand) that the OSPs add them to their networks and website.200  There 
is no guarantee, however, that the detection system will work effectively or will 
continue to work as OSPs change and update their systems.  Moreover, there is 
no incentive for OSPs to facilitate detection tools because it could lead to more 
potential liability by increasing the OSP’s knowledge of content on the site.  
Thus, rightsholders are left using the DMCA’s tools to encourage the OSP to 
curb infringement.  It would be more effective to give the rightsholders the 
information they need to develop better detection mechanisms, but under the 
current regime, OSPs have no incentive to give it to them. 
To facilitate the sharing of APIs and back-end storage solutions, Congress 
should be prepared to offer OSPs an almost unconditional safe harbor in 
exchange for participation.  The only exceptions being for bad faith dealing, 
failure to provide some required piece of technology, or situations where the 
OSP is willfully blind to specific instances of infringement, similar to the current 
case law.  This would greatly incentivize the OSPs to cooperate and enter into 
agreements with the rightsholders.  
The terms of the agreements should include some statutory minimums and 
create positions within the OSPs organization and the rightsholders organization 
to spearhead communication between the two.  For example, the terms of the 
agreement should at least provide information on how content is stored on the 
site or network.  In Twitch’s case, an agreement might include how Twitch stores 
and organizes VODs on its servers or even how streams are encoded and 
broadcast to viewers.  In turn, a rightsholder, a record label for instance, could 
 
200 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(B) (requiring OSPs to accommodate and not interfere with 
“standard technical measures,” i.e. detection methods). 
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use that information to develop an algorithm to sift through VODs or streams 
and flag videos more reliably.   
Most importantly, the parties should agree on what content should be 
removed.  One of the greatest dangers of the DMCA is the removal of content 
that is not legally infringing.  Under a new statutory regime, the parties should be 
required to draw the line themselves.  While it might be difficult for the two sides 
to agree initially, the certainty provided would be beneficial for not only the OSPs 
and rightsholders but also for the content creators and users of the website.  
Users who upload content would be incentivized to avoid infringing content 
because they would be detected more easily and singled out for liability.  Thus, 
the primary infringers have a higher likelihood of having their access to the 
website or the internet revoked and potential copyright liability. 
In the event negotiations break down, Congress should provide for 
mandatory arbitration to dictate the terms of the agreement.201  This would 
ensure that the parties can reach an agreement and participate in the new regime.  
Moreover, the threat of arbitration after the parties have agreed in principle 
would incentivize them to reach an agreement during negotiation without a 
formal proceeding. 
Lastly, Congress should provide for penalties against the rightsholders for 
improper disclosures of the OSPs’ APIs or back-end storage.  OSPs are 
protective of their trade secrets and disclosure of an important algorithm or API 
would be extremely detrimental.202  Therefore, the amendments to the DMCA 
should include a statutory penalty or right of action against the rightsholder if 
the information is negligently handled or improperly disclosed.  The agreement 
between the parties or even the amendments to the DMCA may contemplate the 
necessary protections taken by the rightsholder, and the OSPs may negotiate for 
additional protections if they wish.  
The amendments proposed in this Note would preserve the original spirit of 
the DMCA.  The original act sought to foster cooperation among OSPs and 
 
201 For example, Congress could provide for a mandatory licensing system like the system 
provided for in the Music Modernization Act.  See Music Modernization - Frequently Asked 
Questions, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., https://www.copyright.gov/music-modernization/faq.html 
(last visited Mar. 27, 2021). 
202 Section 1(4) of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act defines a trade secret as information 
that:  “(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and 
not being readily ascertainable by . . . , other persons who can obtain economic value from its 
disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain 
its secrecy.”  UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1985) (emphasis added). 
Technology companies increasingly hide . . . algorithms and business models behind the shield 
of trade secret protection.”  Marietje Schaake, Trade Secrets Shouldn’t Shield Tech Companies’ 
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rightsholders to remove infringing content.203  The proposed exchange of APIs 
and back-end storage information extends this idea and cooperation into 
detecting the infringing content, which is almost impossible for either side on its 
own.  The exchange offers even more certainty to both parties and content 
creators online.  Most importantly, the amendments remedy the disease that has 
infected the knowledge standard by facilitating the discovery of knowledge, 
which neither party wants to do under the current standard. 
V. GAME OVER:  A HAPPY END FOR TWITCH 
For Twitch, trading API and back-end storage information to avoid liability 
would be a dream come true.  Currently, Twitch is in a pickle trying to negotiate 
licenses from rightsholders, remove infringing content, and keep its users happy.  
An agreement under the amendments proposed above would solve all of 
Twitch’s problems at once.  The need for licenses would be more acute than the 
general license Twitch is currently attempting to negotiate because Twitch could 
more readily determine what types of licenses it requires.204  Twitch would also 
have to spend less time identifying content to remove and simply remove the 
content identified under the agreement.  Lastly, streamers would be able to avoid 
infringing activity and disciplinary action from Twitch without having to guess 
whether their stream violates the community DMCA guidelines.  
Rightsholders would also benefit.  By giving the information to rightsholders, 
such as ESPN or record labels, Twitch would enable those companies to identify 
streams to be taken down more readily.  For instance, the agreement might 
include an API that allows the rightsholders to monitor streams as they pass 
through Twitch’s servers.  This would allow illegal streams to be taken down 
quickly and pre-empt injury to the rightsholders.  Additionally, it would be easier 
to detect repeat offenders and permanently ban them. 
These amendments further the cooperative spirit of the DMCA and treat the 
cause of the DMCA’s growing pains without the uncertainty or crudely shifting 
liability in hopes that the courts will figure it out the second time.  Thus, Congress 
should protect Twitch and its peers as well as rightsholders by drafting legislation 
that provides for the licensing of detection tools as outlined above.  In this 
sequel, Congress would be the hero who once again brought peace to the land, 






203 S. REP. NO. 105-90, at 20 (1998). 
204 As a subsidiary of Amazon, Twitch has many opportunities to meet this need and real 
negotiating power to make the deals happen. Kim, supra note 7. 
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